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Senior Lecturer in Law, University of the Witwatersrand,Johannesburg
1 INTRODUCTION
Family law is probably the area of South African private law which has
expanded and changed most rapidly in the past nine years. Many of these
changes have come about as a result of the enactment of a Bill of Rights in
both the interim and the final Constitution. 1 On the one hand, this is not
surprising, since family law contains many legal rules which are overtly
discriminatory on the bases of sex, gender, culture, religion and sexual
orientation. On the other hand, legal rules in this area represent a codification
of moral and social norms in the quotidian and 'private' lives of many people,
which are often resistant to scrutiny and change. 2
This article represents a preliminary investigation into the influence of
constitutional rights on family law. Although I also refer to legislation enacted
to give content to fundamental rights, my primary interest lies in judicial
responses to the interaction between the Constitution and family law. In the
first part I address general issues around the development of the common law
in light of the Constitution, while the second part contains more specific
analyses of the articulation of fundamental rights in family law. Although
family law contains a great deal of common-law rules, I also include cases
which deal with the constitutionality of legislation, because tests and approaches
developed in assessing the constitutionality of legislation, like the definition
of equality, are also relevant to the development of the common law.
The relationship between the Bill of Rights and existing legal rules is
commonly described in terms of two distinctions: that between horizontal
and vertical application and between direct and indirect application. 3 The
issue of horizontal and vertical application of the Bill of Rights relates to the
* LLB LLM (Stell) PhD (Cantab). I wish to thank the following people for assistance in finding materials,
reading and commenting on this article: Angelo Pantazis, Marius Pieterse and Chris Roederer.
' Acts 200 of 1993 and 108 of 1996, hereinafter referred to, respectively, as the interim Constitution and
the final Constitution.
2 The extent of changes in family law in response to fundamental human rights can be contrasted with
other areas ofprivate law, such as the law of contract, where the courts are less willing to change common-law
rules. See Garden Cities Incorporated Association Not For Gain v Northpine Islanic Sodety 1999 (2) SA 268 (C);
Knox D'Arcy Ltd v Shaw 1996 (2) SA 651 (W).
3 Johan de Waal, lain Currie & Gerhard Erasmus The Bill of Rights Handbook 4 ed (2001) 45-6.
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parties who are subject to the operation of the Bill of Rights. It is clear that
the Bill of Rights applies vertically in that actions by state organs are subject
to its provisions. 4 This reflects the traditional function of constitutional guaran-
tees which is to protect the individual from potentially harmful state action.5
Horizontal operation of the Bill of Rights would extend this constitutional
function to also protect individuals against potentially harmful actions from
other individuals. 6 In Du Plessis v De Klerk7 the Constitutional Court held
that the interim Constitution could apply horizontally, but that its horizontal
operation could only be indirect. The issue is now regulated by s 8(2) of the
final Constitution which determines that: '[a] provision of the Bill of Rights
binds a natural or juristic person if, and to the extent that, it is applicable,
taking into account the nature of the right and the nature of any duty imposed
by the right.' The reference to the nature of the right relates to the fact that
certain fundamental rights in the Bill of Rights are, as a result of their
formulation, directly applicable to natural persons. Thus, s 9(4) indicates that
,no person may unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone' on
certain grounds,8 while s 12(1)(c) contains the right 'to be free from all forms
of violence from either public or private sources'. 9
Where it has been established that the Bill of Rights applies to the actions
of a natural person, s 8(3) determines as follows:
'When applying a provision of the Bill of Rights to a natural or juristic person in terms
of subsection (2), a court -
(a) in order to give effect to a right in the Bill, must apply, or if necessary develop, the
common law to the extent that legislation does not give effect to that right.
This relates to the distinction between direct and indirect application of the
Bill ofRights. Direct application would mean that the Bill of Rights overrides
any law which conflicts with it and provides litigants who rely on fundamental
rights with special remedies based on their fundamental rights. 10 It would also
be possible to found a cause of action on specific fundamental rights without
recourse to legislation or the common law. 11 Where the fundamental rights
in the Bill of Rights apply indirectly, they do not found a cause of action, but
function instead as higher values which provide guidelines for the interpre-
tation and application of existing legal rules, which in turn determine the
procedures followed and remedies awarded. 12
4 Section 8(1) of the final Constitution determines that '[t]he Bill of Rights applies to all law, and binds
the legislature, the executive, the judiciary and all organs of state'
5 Alfred Cockrel 'Private law and the Bill of Rights: A threshold issue of "horizontality" ' in Bill of
Rights Compendiuni Service Issue 10 (2001) para 3A2.
6 De Waal et al op cit note 3 at 46.
7 1996 (3) SA 850 (CC).
8 The subsection also requires that legislation be enacted to prevent unfair, private discrimination.
I De Waal et al op cit note 3 at 56-7. A detailed discussion of the horizontal application of fundamental
rights does not form part of this article. See De Waal et a] op cit note 3 at 55-7.
10 De Waal et a] op cit note 3 at 37. Constitutional remedies could also consist of existing common-law
actions applied to new situations.
I1 Cockrell op cit note 5 para 3A4.
12 De Waal et al op cit note 3 at 37; Cockrell op cit note 5 para 3A4;Johan van der Walt 'Progressive
indirect horizontal application of the Bill of Rights: Towards a co-operative relation between common-law
and constitutional jurisprudence' 2001 (17) SAJHR 341 at 345.
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Alfred Cockrell indicates that debates around the horizontal application
of the Bill of Rights often conflate two issues which are, on the one hand,
whether the common law should be subject to the Bill of Rights and, on the
other hand, whether private individuals are subject to the Bill of Rights. 13
These should remain distinct, because the common law not only regulates
relations between individuals, but also contains rules pertaining to state
action. 14 Horizontality therefore relates only to the parties involved in
litigation and not necessarily to whether the common law is involved.
Moreover, the impression that all disputes involving the common law
would only be indirectly subject to the Bill of Rights, while matters involving
legislation would always involve direct application of the Bill of Rights is also
incorrect. The Bill of Rights can be applied directly or indirectly to both the
common law and legislation. In the case of legislation, indirect application of
the Bill of Rights would involve the process of reading down or reading in
so that legislation is interpreted according to constitutional values, 15 a process
similar to that of developing the common law to reflect the values underlying
the Bill of Rights. Direct application of the Bill of Rights to common law
would involve those admittedly rare situations where there are no existing
common-law rules and remedies to deal with a situation and would require
courts to create new common-law remedies. 16
Family law concerns itself primarily with relations between private indi-
viduals such as husbands and wives or parents and children. Therefore
constitutional challenges to law family-law rules will often be horizontal.
However, family law is comprised of both statutory law and common law and
can therefore also be challenged vertically.
Cockrell indicates that as a result of the particular structure of horizontal
application in the final Constitution,
'the common law is required to play a mediating role, for it is the common law that must
be applied or developed in order to give effect to the conclusion already reached (namely,
that a particular right binds a private agency). Expressed differently, we may say that
constitutional rights do not apply against private agencies in a free-floating manner, for any
conclusion reached in terms of section 8(2) is firmly attached to the application and
development of the common law in terms of section 8(3).' 17
This incorporates a 'substantive' style of reasoning into family law, which has
hitherto often been more comfortable with formalistic legal reasoning. 18The
13 Cockrell op cit note 5 para 3A2.
14 Cockrell op cit note 5 para 3A3.
is De Waal et al op cit note 3 at 70-5. They indicate at 66-70 that this process is the result of the
constitutional preference forjudicial minimalism.Judicial mimmalism will be discussed below.
16 See for instanceJooste v Botha 2000 (2) SA 199 (T) and the discussion of the case by Van der Walt op
cit note 12 at 352-5. The issue of direct vertical application of the Bill of Rights has been discussed in depth.
See for instance Halton Cheadle & Dennis Davis 'The application of the 1996 Constitution in the private
sphere' 1997 (13) SAJHR 44 at 61;Chris Spriganan & Michael Osborne 'Du Plessis is not dead: South Africa's
1996 Constitution and the application of the Bill of Rights to private disputes' (1999) 15 SAJHR 25.This
debate falls outside the scope of this article.
17 Cockrell op cit note 5 para 3A10.
8 Cockrell op cit note 5 para 3A10. See also A P H Cockrell 'Adjudication styles in South African
private law' (1993) 56 THRHR 590;Alfred Cockrell 'Rainbowjurisprudence' (1996) 12 SAJHR 1.This issue
will be discussed more fully below.
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aim of this article is to provide an analysis and evaluation of different aspects
of the way in which courts have fared in this project.
2 OVERVIEW OF AREAS DEALING WITH HUMAN RIGHTS
IN FAMILY LAW
2.1 General
The purpose of this overview is twofold. It provides a context for the more
theoretical discussion which follows and draws attention to developing
patterns ofjurisprudence within the broader framework of family law. I have
surveyed family law cases in certain broad categories: immigration, gay and
lesbian families, customary marriage, Muslim marriage, rights of unmarried
fathers, relocation, adoption and custody of children, abduction and domestic
violence and socio-economic rights of family members. Although some cases
do not fall strictly within the realm of family law, they contain formulations
of certain fundamental rights which are crucial to the development of family
law. Cases dealing with gay and lesbian families, customary law and Muslim
marriages are primarily concerned with the recognition of different family
groupings and whether the right to family life should be afforded to them as
groups. The other categories of cases deal with the relationships between
family members, particularly in their roles as parents and children. In this
regard the constitutional principle of the best interests of the child plays a
central role. However, issues of gender equality are often relevant, especially
where rights awarded to parents are gender-specific.
2.2 Immigration cases and the right to family life
Unlike many international instruments, neither the interim nor the final
Constitutions contain rights to family life. Whether the final Constitution was
defective because of this was one of the issues in Ex parte Chairperson of the
Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of
South Africa, 1996.19 The court pointed out that there was no international
consensus on the necessity for an express right to family life in a constitution,
since its presence could fuel controversy about the definition of family life
and the ceremonies and formalities which establish a family. It was therefore
open to the Constitutional Assembly to protect this right either directly or
indirectly. Family life is indirectly protected by the rights of detained persons
to communicate with their families and the rights of children to parental or
family care. Moreover, the right to dignity indirectly protects family life
because any law which infringes the right to marry the person of one's choice,
for instance, would also infringe the right to dignity.
This early indication of the incorporation of the right to family life with-
in the right to dignity is developed and applied in several cases dealing
with immigration laws which deter spouses and their children from living
19 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC), paras 98-102.
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together.20 Particularly important is the Constitutional Court's dictum in
Dawood v Minister of Home Affairs; Shalabi v Minister of Home Affairs; Thomas v
Minister of Home Affairs21 that families take different forms, and that the state
should not entrench one form of family at the expense of others. 22 Any re-
striction on the abilities of spouses to honour their obligations to one another
would infringe upon their rights to dignity and could be unconstitutional. 23
2.3 Legal protection of different family groups
2.3.1 Gay and lesbian families
The first extensive analysis of equality in relation to sexual orientation by
a High Court can be found in National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality
v Minister of Justice24 in which the Coalition challenged the constitutional
validity of the common-law and statutory crimes prohibiting gay sexual
conduct. Citing Constitutional Court authority on the meaning of the right
to dignity, patterns of harm and group disadvantage, 25 the court applied the
rational connection test to decide whether the differentiation between gay
and straight men served a legitimate government purpose. It held that the
criminal prohibitions deprive gay men of the satisfaction of a basic human
need which is central to family life, while heterosexual men are not similarly
limited in their sexual expression. 26 Since there is no logical basis for this
distinction, and since religious or popular beliefs cannot provide such a basis,27
the court found the offences to be unconstitutional. The link between sexual
expression and family life is an important precursor to later cases which extend
the right to family life to gay and lesbian partners. Cathi Albertyn and Beth
Goldblatt point out that the court's focus on rational connection means that
the judgment does not deal with issues of substantial equality and fails to take
account of historical patterns of discrimination. 28
This focus was expressly adopted when the matter came to be confirmed
by the Constitutional Court in National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality
v Minister ofJustice.29 Quoting Harksen v Lane NO,30 the court held that the
impact of discrimination on the particular complainants and other members
20 Dawood v Minister of Home Affairs; Shalabi v Minister of Home Affairs; Thomas v Minister of Home Affairs
2000 (1) SA 997 (C); Dawood v Minister of Home Affairs; Shalabi v Minister of Home Affairs; Thomas v Minister of
Home Affairs 2000 (3) SA 936 (CC); Patel v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 (2) SA 343 (D); Makinana v Minister
of Home Affairs; Keelty v Minister of Home Affairs 2001 (6) BCLR 581 (C); Booysen v Minister of Home Affairs
2001 (4) SA 485 (CC).
21 Supra note 20.
22 Paragraph 31.
23 Paragraph 37.
24 1998 (6) BCLR 726 (W).
25 At 744C-D, 744H-I and 745F
26 At 746E-F.
27 At 746-8.
28 'The decriminaization of gay sexual offences: The National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v
The Minister ofJustice and Others 1998 (6) BCLR 726 (W)' (1998) 14 SAJHR 461 at 463-5.
29 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC). The Constitutional Court held that where unfair and unjustifiable discrinination
is established there is no need to deal with the rational connection test. See para 18.
30 1998 (1) SA 300 (CC), paras 50-1.
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oftheir group will determine whether the discrimination is unfair. This would
require an analysis of the position which the complainants occupy in society,
the existence of patterns of historical disadvantage and the impact of the
discrimination on their dignity.31 The court held that in order to understand
the position of the complainant group fully, it should attempt to place itself
in its position. 32 This is significant, since it indicates a shift from the traditional
legal epistemology of objectivity and neutrality to one ofimaginative empathy
in equality jurisprudence. Gay men were described as a permanent minority
who lack the political power to improve their social and legal position. 33
Describing their position, the court pointed to existing social prejudice,
discrimination in areas such as employment and insurance, the impact of
harmful stereotypes on their psychological welfare, and the way in which the
prohibition of gay sexual activities encourages harmful behaviour like black-
mail, anti-gay violence and police entrapment. Given their impact on the lives
of gay men, the statutory and common-law prohibitions therefore constituted
unfair discrimination and were struck down.34
Moreover, the disputed provisions also infringed the complainants' rights
to dignity and privacy, since grounds of unfair discrimination can intersect to
produce overlapping vulnerability.35 The minority judgment extended the
right to privacy beyond the right to be left alone to encompass the right to
establish and live in supportive personal and public contexts and relationships.
This entails a duty upon the state to establish the conditions for the fulfilment
of this right.36 However, both the minority and majority judgments are
notable for using the privacy right to focus on the protection of relationships
rather than sexual acts in private.
A failure to extend immigration exemptions in favour of spouses in civil
and customary marriages to same-sex couples was declared unconstitutional
in National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Home Affairs.37
While the High Court found the legislation discriminatory on the basis of
sexual orientation,38 the Constitutional Court found overlapping discrimina-
tion on the bases of sexual orientation and marital status. 39 As in National
Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister ofJustice,40 it again embarked
upon an in-depth analysis of the impact of the discrimination on the dignity
of the complainants, 41 focusing particularly on stereotypical definitions of gay
31 Paragraph 19.
32 Paragraph 22.
33 Paragraph 25.
34 Paragraphs 23-4 and 26.
35 Paragraphs 30 and 113-14.
36 The majority judgment, in para 32, defined privacy as the right to 'establish and nurture human
relationships without interference from the outside community'. The minority judgment by SachsJ linked
the right to privacy to the right to identity and emphasized the fact that rights are not exercised in isolation,
but by people as members of communities. See paras 116-19.
37 1999 (3) SA 173 (C). The judgment was confirmed by the Constitutional Court, the decision of
which was reported in 2000 (2) SA I (CC).
38 At 185H.
39 Paragraphs 39-40.
40 Supra note 29.
41 Paragraph 41.
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and lesbian couples in terms of their sexual practices and their inability to
procreate 'naturally', which devalue the family lives of same-sex couples. 42
The court held that same-sex partners could establish all the elements of the
consortium omnis vitae, which in common law define a family, and that they
should therefore be afforded the legal protection available to other families. 43
The implications for the validity of Muslim marriages and for the rights of
cohabitants were expressly limited.44 This dictum arguably implies that the
common-law definition of marriage as the legally recognized voluntary union
for life of one man and one woman to the exclusion of all others while it
lasts45 would be unconstitutional, at least as far as same-sex partnerships are
concerned. The court held that the appropriate remedy was to read the words
,or partner in a permanent same-sex partnership'into the legislation to confer
on same-sex couples the same rights as spouses. 46
Vv V47 was a custody dispute where the mother was involved in a lesbian
relationship. The father relied on the decision in Van Rooyen v Van Rooyen48
to argue that the mother's 'abnormal' sexual orientation would harm the
sexual development of her children. The court held that the inclusion ofsexual
orientation as a prohibited ground in the equality clause of the final Constitu-
tion rendered it legally incorrect to refer to a gay or lesbian sexual orientation
as abnormal.49 Moreover, a court could not perpetuate societal discrimination
against gay or lesbian parents under the guise of protecting the interests of
children.50 A bold assertion to the same effect can be found in Ex parte
Critchfield5l in the context of gay extra-marital affairs by the father in a custody
dispute. Apart from the assertions that gay or lesbian sexual orientation could
not be said to be abnormal, these cases do not provide any equality analysis
whatsoever, but nevertheless develop the common law by disregarding a single
precedent in relation to the best interests of children.
In Langemaat v Minster of Safety and Security52 the applicant questioned the
constitutional validity of regulations in terms of the South African Police
Services pension fund rules which excluded lesbian and gay life partners from
the definition of dependants. Despite the fact that the application was directed
to the validity of statutory regulations, the court nevertheless held that the
common-law duty of maintenance should extend also to same-sex life
partners. This was done with a startling lack of authority. The core of the
judgment seems to be the judge's
42 Paragraphs 49-52 and 54.
43 Paragraphs 46 and 53.
4 Paragraphs 60 and 87.
45 Seedat's Executors v The Master (Natal) 1917 AD 302 at 309; Ismail v Ismail 1983 (1) SA 1006 (A) at
1019H.
46 Paragraph 86.
47 1998 (4) SA 169 (C).
48 1994 (2) SA 325 (W).
49 At 189B.
50 At 189F-190E.
51 [1999] 1 All SA 319 (W) at 326d-e.
12 1998 (7) SA 312 (T).
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'experience and knowledge of several same sex couples who have lived together for years.
The stability and permanence oftheir relationship [sic] is no different from the many married
couples I know. Both types of union are deserving of respect and protection. If our law does
not accord protection to the type of union I am dealing with then I suggest it is time it
does so.'
3
The case contains no equality analysis, no engagement with the principles of
the common law, and seems to replace legal reasoning with mere assertions
as to what the law ought to be. 54
The Constitutional Court analysis in the Minister of Home Affairs case5 5 was
followed closely in Satchwell v President of the Republic of South Africa,56 in which
the constitutionality of sections of the Judges Remuneration and Conditions
ofEmployment Act 88 of 1989, which denied spousal benefits to the same-sex
partners ofjudges,was challenged. The impact of the laws on same-sex couples
was held to be similar to that of the immigration regulations and they were
held to discriminate on the bases of sexual orientation and marital status.57
The argument on behalf of the President that the Act merely reflected the
common-law position that there is no duty of support between same-sex
partners was dismissed by reference to the dictum in Amod v Multilateral Motor
Vehicle Accident Fund (Commission for Gender Equality Intervening)58 that a duty
of support can extend beyond common-law marriage, and to the finding in
Langemaat that such a duty exists between same-sex partners. However,
problems with the Langemaat judgment were not addressed, nor was its
inadequate exposition of the common law supplemented. Counsel for the
President also argued that the common-law definition of marriage, rather
than the content of the Act, caused the discrimination in this instance and
should have been the focus of attack.5 9 However, following the Minister of
Home Affairs case, the court did not address this issue.
Sections 17 and 20(1) of the Child Care Act 74 of 1983 allow for the joint
adoption of a child by spouses, but unmarried couples are not allowed to
adopt jointly, with the result that gay and lesbian partners cannot both have
parental rights in respect of adopted children. This is confirmed by s 1(2) of
the Guardianship Act 192 of 1993, which determines that mothers and fathers
have equal rights of guardianship in respect of legitimate children, but fails to
give similar rights to same-sex, unmarried parents. This legislation was the
subject of an unopposed constitutional challenge in Du Toit v Minister of Wefare
and Population Development.60 The court held that the lacunae in the legal rules
rendered them unconstitutional, but failed to analyse the right to equality or
the best interests of the child apart from referring to the applicants' affidavits
s3 At 316F-H.
54 See Ockert Dupper & Christoph Garber 'The provision of benefits to and discruimnanon against
same-sex couples' (1999) 20 ILJ 77; Ronald Louw 'Langemaat v Minister of Safety and Security 1998 (3) SA
312 (T): A gay and lesbian victory but a constitutional travesty' (1999) 15 SAJHR 393.
55 Supra note 37.
56 2001 (12) BCLR 1284 (T).
57 Paragraphs 14, 17-21 and 23.
58 1999 (4) SA 1319 (SCA) at 1328B.
59 At 1289C-E.
60 2001 (12) BCLR 1225 (T).
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and arguments. 6 1 The main basis for the decision seems to have been that the
legislation compromised the dignity (as understood in the law of delict) of
same-sex adoptive parents62 without any reference to the extensive constitu-
tional interpretations of the rights to dignity and family life in other same-sex
cases.63 The Du Toit judgment did not even state the basis upon which the
discrimination was held to exist. The practical and symbolic effects of the
current legal position for same-sex parents as a group and their position in
society, including patterns of discrimination against such parents, were simply
assumed.
In the same-sex partnership cases the willingness of courts to provide relief
is evident. The Constitutional Court's analysis of intersecting grounds of
discrimination, the judicial stance of imaginative empathy, the substantive and
contextual equality test and the progressive formulation of the right to privacy
are particularly noteworthy in this regard. Also striking is the way in which
these developments have been driven by strategic litigation by the National
Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality. It chooses not to attack the root cause
of their exclusion from family law, namely the common-law definition of
marriage, but to focus on separate common-law and legislative provisions
with the aim of extending the consequences of common-law marriage to
same-sex relationships. In this the Constitutional Court has assisted it, most
manifestly by indicating that same-sex couples are capable of all the elements
of the consortium onmis vitae traditionally ascribed to marriage. However,
the court has been careful to limit its pronouncements to same-sex partner-
ships and avoided all mention of the common-law definition of marriage.
Notwithstanding this, the judgments in Vv 46 and the Langemaat, Satchwell
and Du Toit cases indicate that some High Courts are not entirely comfortable
with the kind of reasoning which the Bill of Rights requires. They appear
eager to assist same-sex couples, but seem to lack the reasoning skills to justify
their decisions, instead merely asserting discrimination. However, the
Constitutional Court's jurisprudence has filtered down to the lower courts
and also to other tribunals, such as,for instance, the Pensions Fund Adjudicator,
which deals essentially with horizontal discrimination. Same-sex couples have
successfully challenged pension fund rules that define spouses and benefici-
aries in terms of common-law or customary marriages, thus excluding
same-sex partners. The tribunal has found such omissions to be discriminatory
and has ordered that definitions be amended to include them. 65
61 Paragraphs 9 and 16-17.
62 Paragraph 14.
63 See for instance National Coalitionfor Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister ofJustice supra note 29, paras 14
and 28; Dawood v Minister of Home Affairs; Shalabi v Minister of Home Affairs; Thomas v Minister of Home Affairs
supra note 20, para 35.
64 Supra note 47.
65 See B M Till v Unilever SA Pension Fund (case no PFA/GA/788/99/SM) in the Tribunal ofthe Pension
Funds Adjudicator; R Martin v Beka Provident Fund (case no PFA/GA/563/99) in the Tribunal of the
Pension Funds Adjudicator (ftp://ftb.fsb.co.za/public/pfa/martin.htm); TWC, DM, JC, GT AH v Rentokil
Pension Fund & DVR (case no FPA/KZN/129/98) in the Tribunal of the Pension Funds Adjudicator
(ftp://fshco.za/public/pfa/chapman.htm).
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2.3.2 Customary families
It is well documented that African women represent the largest number
of people in the lowest educational, social and economic position in the
country.66 In Mthembu v Letsela67 a customary rule according to which the
wife and female children of a deceased man cannot inherit was challenged by
a wife. The case also involved a factual dispute about the existence of a
customary marriage between the applicant and the deceased. The gender
discrimination argument on behalf of the wife was dismissed on the basis that,
in rural areas, this rule of succession was accompanied by an obligation upon
the male heir to maintain the widow and children. This rendered the
differentiation between men and women fair.68 The court not only failed to
analyse the disadvantaged position of women who find themselves in the
position of the applicant, but failed to consider the fact that the applicant
actually lived in an urban area where, according to her evidence, the duty to
maintain was not practised. The judge also held that '[i]n view of the manifest
acknowledgement of customary law as a system existing parallel to the
common law by the Constitution ... and the freedom granted to persons to
choose this system as governing their relationships,... I cannot accept the
submission that the succession rule is necessarily in conflict with s 8.'69 A
contextual analysis of the circumstances under which women like the
applicant live would have indicated clearly that the notion of their having
chosen to be regulated by customary law is unrealistic. In any event, the fact
that people can choose to have a legal system apply to their lives does not
remove the constitutional need to develop those rules.
The matter was referred for the presentation of oral evidence about the
existence of a marriage. 70 Neither party presented evidence at the second
hearing and the matter was therefore finally decided on the basis that the girl
born from the relationship was illegitimate. 71 The mother then argued that
the rule of succession according to which her child would not inherit
discriminated on the basis of gender. The court, however, pointed out that the
reason for the child's not inheriting was not her gender, but the fact that she
was born out of wedlock and therefore that the equality principle had not
been infringed. 72 The court was then invited to develop the customary law
of succession in accordance with s 35(3) of the interim Constitution. This
invitation was declined since changing the customary rule of succession in
relation to female heirs would impact on the whole system of customary law,
a task best left to the legislature.7 3
66 Debbie Budlender (ed) The Fourth Women's Budget (1999) tables 7.1 and 7.7.
67 1997 (2) SA 936 ).
68 At 945A- and 946C-D.
69 At 945J-946A. Section 8(2) contained the prohibition on discrimination in the interim Constitution.
70 The second case was reported as 1998 (2) SA 675 (T).
7' The wife would have been deterred from bringing evidence of a marriage by the clear indication
that the court would then apply the customary rule in terms of which the husband's father would have been
the heir.
72 At 686D-H. The interim Constitution did not prohibit discrimination on the basis of birth.
73 At 686H-687C.
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Hope v Mahlalela74 concerned a custody dispute between the maternal
grandparents and the father of a child born from a customary marriage. The
grandparents argued that the father had not paid all the lobolo for the marriage
and therefore did not have a right to custody of the child. The court held that,
although s 1(1) of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1998 allows a
court to take cognizance of customary law, the principles relating to children
have been modified in three respects. First, the best interests of the child should
take precedence over customary rules; secondly, where parents were also
married according to civil law, the civil-law rules would apply; and thirdly,
'[a]ny arrangement that smacks of the sale of or the trafficking in children
will not be enforced' .75 These developments were regarded as confirmed by
the best interests principle in the interim Constitution. The decision to award
custody to the father was motivated by holding that the Swazi custody rules
were insufficiently established and that it would be in the best interests of the
child to live with her father. 76
This case is disturbing for several reasons, not the least of which is the
description of customary custody rules as possibly amounting to the sale of
children. The fundamental tension between the best interests standard as
applied in civil law and constitutional rights to culture and religion is not
even acknowledged. It may well be in the best interests of an African child to
be raised according to customary norms. Developing customary law in
accordance with the Bill of Rights should not merely entail the replacement
of customary rules by civil-law rules.
The validity of a customary marriage where a man negotiated for, and paid,
lobolo to the mother of the bride was in issue in Mabena v Letsoalo.77Although
the mother's receiving the lobolo would be contrary to customary law, the
court held that a practice was developing whereby the mother could receive
lobolo when the father had left the family.78 The court acknowledged
the difference between the official versions of customary law as recorded by
anthropologists in the 19th century and the 'living law' actually observed
by people and held that customary law should, like all systems of law, develop
to meet the changing needs and circumstances of the community which
practises it. Developing the customary rule to allow the mother of the bride
to receive lobolo would be in accordance with the spirit and objectives of the
Bill of Rights. 79
Although the outcome of this case is welcome in ameliorating the material
and social disadvantages faced by this disadvantaged group of women and
children, it lacks a sustained analysis of the conflicts around gender equality
74 1998 (1) SA 449 MT.
75 At 458F-459E.
76 Despite the ostensible concern for the interests of the child, the court nevertheless declined to
interview the 11-year-old girl and disregarded her testimony that she would prefer to remain with her
grandparents, without giving its reasons (at 461 D-G).
77 1998 (2) SA 1068 (T).
78 At 1074C-G.
79 At 1074H-1 and 1075B.
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and the rights to culture. The court merely asserts that a particular develop-
ment would accord with the objects of the Bill of Rights without taking into
account the complex dynamics which will continue to plague this area of law.
There was, for instance, no analysis of the social function of lobolo in
customary marriages, nor a contextual analysis of gender equality as it relates
to the particular parties or others in the same position.S0
Section 37 of the Transkei Marriage Act 21 of 1978 provides that in both
civil and customary marriages husbands are the guardians of their wives, while
s 39 precludes parties to a civil marriage from excluding the marital power
by way of antenuptial contract. 81 The applicant in Prior v Battle8 2 argued that
these provisions were unconstitutional in respect of civil marriages, both
where lobolo had been paid and where it had not been paid, and in respect
of customary marriages. The court declined to make a ruling in respect of
customary marriages, since that would require a separate investigation into
the effects of polygamy and the significance of patriarchy in customary
marriages.83 However, the court embarked on an equality analysis, reflecting
on the effect of the marital power on the applicant and other wives in civil
marriages. The marital power limited the applicant's ability to administer her
estate and gave her husband power over her person. 84 It also affected her rights
to dignity, access to the courts and the right to acquire and hold property. As
such it amounted to 'the most notable example of glaring inequality in our
law'. 85 African women in respect of whose civil marriages lobolo had been
paid, are similarly affected and the ruling should also apply to them, on the
basis that their marriages retain the character of civil marriages. 86
Although the case contains a rudimentary equality analysis in relation to
civil marriages where no lobolo had been paid, a detailed contextual exami-
nation would have indicated both the similarities and the differences between
the positions of women married according to customary law, those married
in terms of civil law with the inclusion of lobolo and those married in terms
of civil law without lobolo. The narrow dichotomy between women married
in terms of civil law and customary law, respectively, fails to recognize that the
latter may suffer from exactly the same restrictions as a result of the marital
power. The idea, implied in the quote above, that customary law may be so
fundamentally patriarchal that it cannot accommodate gender equality
without disrupting its very fabric, associates customary law and African culture
with male domination while the same assumption is not made in relation to
o Many African women who are abandoned by their husbands, because of the system of migrant labour,
lack the legal capacity in customary law to regulate their family lives. Section 6 of the Recognition of
Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 now provides that wives married in terms of customary law have
legal capacity equal to that of their husbands.
81 The Law Commission's Report on the Review of the Marriage Act 25 of 1961 (Project 109, 2001) 189
recommends that the Marriage Acts in the previous homelands be repealed and that the (South African)
Marriage Act 25 of 1961 apply uniformly across the country.
82 1999 (2) SA 850 (Tk).
83 At 860H.
84 At 858F-859A.
85 At 859D-J and 859B.
86 At 861D-I.
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civil law. The right to culture is, it seems, only viewed as relevant to customary
marriages, with the tacit assumption that civil-law marriage is culturally
neutral.
In Metiso v Padongelukfondss7 it was held that a customary duty of support
should be recognized in civil law 8 8 on the basis of the Supreme Court of
Appeal's decision in Amod v Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accident Fund.89 The court
also recognized the customary rule that the consent of the child's mother and
her family was unnecessary for the adoption of a child. It held that where it
was shown that the mother had abandoned the child, requiring her consent
for its adoption would be contrary to the best interests of the child and thus
contra bonos mores. 90
The judgment was based on the existence of a customary rule and on the
best interests of the child generally, but failed to deal with constitutional rights
to culture and, more importantly, the issue of gender discrimination. If the
customary rule regarding adoption was to be accepted, the rule should have
been developed to reflect the demands of gender equality and the changing
behaviour of the community practising customary law. In Kewana v Santam
Insurance91 the court held, for instance, that in the Transkei the customary rules
of adoption have changed as the result of women's emancipation to allow
unmarried women to adopt children. Moreover, it could be regarded as being
generally in the interests of a child to require the consent of its mother to its
adoption.
When comparing these cases with those involving gay and lesbian families,
the infrequent and superficial reference to constitutional rights is remarkable.
Even in Mabena v Letsoalo,92 where customary law was developed, the court
failed to embark upon the detailed and contextual equality analysis found in
the gay and lesbian cases. The judicial stance of imaginative empathy required
when analysing the impact of subordination is simply absent when courts deal
with the problems faced by African women. In other cases like Prior v Battle,93
Hlope v Mahlalela94 and Metiso v Padongelukfonds95 courts simply refuse to
develop customary rules which discriminate on the basis of gender. Central
to debates around the recognition of both customary law and Muslim
marriage is the issue of competing fundamental rights to culture and gender
equality. This debate should be addressed by way of rigorous constitutional
analysis, and not merely ignored. Moreover, except for Mabena v Letsoalo,96
the cases seem to take the content of customary rules at face value, ignoring
the existence of a well-documented distinction between 'official' versions of
87 2001 (3) SA 1142 (T).
88 At 1150D-I.
89 Supra note 58.
90 At 1147H-I and 1149D-E.
91 1993 (4) SA 771 (TkA).
92 Supra note 77.
93 Supra note 82.
94 Supra note 74.
95 Supra note 87.
96 Supra note 77.
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customary law and contemporary cultural practice which is neither static nor
homogeneous. 97
2.3.4 Muslim families
Unlike customary marriages, Muslim marriages are not recognized as
legally valid.98 This leaves wives and children unable to inherit intestate from
a deceased husband and courts are unwilling to provide wives with mainte-
nance and a share of the husband's estate at divorce. In Kalla v The Master99 a
Muslim widow sought a share of her husband's estate on the basis ofa marriage
in community of property, alternatively on the basis of a tacit universal
partnership. The Muslim marriage was held to be invalid at common law on
the basis that it was potentially polygamous and therefore offended against
the boni mores. 100 The interim Constitution was not applicable, since it did
not operate retrospectively,10 1 and in any event 'the principle of gender
equality may well lead to the conclusion that polygamous (and potentially
polygamous) marriages are as unacceptable to the mores of the new South
Africa as they were to the old'. 102 This is unacceptable, since the issue ofgender
equality was not canvassed properly at all. The statement assumes all Muslim
marriages to be patriarchal,while civil marriages are presumably all egalitarian.
It would be cold comfort for the particular litigant to be told that legal relief
is refused in order to protect her from the consequences of a patriarchal
marriage.103
In Ryland v Edrosl04 the parties were also married before the adoption of
the interim Constitution, but the court held that it was applicable, since the
relevant time was not that of the conclusion of the marriage contract, but
rather when a court was asked to enforce it.105 The matter was decided on
the basis of the validity of the marriage contract and not on the validity of
Muslim marriages in general. The court held that the meaning of open-ended
common-law concepts like boni mores and public policy should be informed
by basic constitutional values such as freedom and equality.106 The constitu-
tional values of equality and accommodation of religious diversity made it
unacceptable for one group to impose its values on all others. 107 The
judgment, however, strongly emphasized the monogamous nature of the
17 See for instance Martin Chanock 'Neither customary nor legal: African customary law in an era of
family law reform' 1989 (3) International Journal of Law and the Family 72 at 78-81; Gregory Hund
'Jurisprudence and legal anthropology:The roles of theory and method revisited' 1979 CILSA 188;AJ G M
Sanders 'How customary is customary law?' 1987 CILSA 405 at 407.
" The issue is currently being investigated. See the Law Commission's Discussion Paper Islamic Marriages
and Related Matters (Project 59, 2001).
'9 1995 (1) SA 261 (T).
'0o At 266A-D.
101 At 269C-270A.
102 At 270G-H.
103 SeeJoan Church 'The dichotomy of marriage revisited: Ryland v Edros' (1997) 60 THRHR 292.
io4 1997 (2) SA 690 (C).
105 At 709G-H.
106 At 704D-705D and 709A.
i07 At 707B-1 and 708J.
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marriage and added that this analysis would not necessarily apply to polyga-
mous Muslim marriages. 108 Even though issues of gender equality were
mentioned by a witness for the applicant, 109 the tension between equality and
religious rights was once again ignored, perhaps because the court did not
work with fundamental rights, but with values underlying the Constitution.
This is problematic. Although ostensibly affording some recognition to
Muslim marriages, the applicant's main claim for a share in her husband's estate
was dismissed on the basis that a progressive system of profit sharing between
Muslim husbands and wives has not been adopted in the South African
Muslim community.110
Most recently, in Amod v Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund11 the issue
was whether the common law should be developed to recognize a duty of
support arising from a Muslim marriage. The matter was complicated by the
fact that the death of the husband occurred before the operation of the interim
and final Constitutions. 112 The court of first instance 113 held that it did not
have the authority to change the existing common-law position that any
contract which creates a duty of maintenance in relation to a potentially
polygamous marriage would be invalid on the grounds of public policy.114
Ryland v Edros1 5 could not be followed because it dealt with the enforcement
of a duty of support between the spouses themselves, which did not mean
that the marriage was valid, or that the duty of support would bind third
parties.116 The applicant requested leave to appeal directly to the Constitu-
tional Court,117 which in turn referred the matter to the SCA.118
In this court the interim Constitution was held to be applicable. 119 The
court held that in Roman-Dutch law the action for loss of support required
a legally enforceable duty to support, that the right to support should be
worthy of legal protection and that this latter requirement should be deter-
mined by the boni mores of society.120 The older cases which required a
widow who claims for loss of support to prove that the duty of support flowed
from a legal marriage were held to be incorrectly decided.121 A duty ofsupport
which flowed from a contract like a Muslim marriage would suffice if it could
be shown that it was worthy of legal protection. In this instance the duty of
support qualified for legal protection because it was the result of a de facto
monogamous marriage according to the tenets of a major religion and
108 At 707F and 709D.
109 At 717E
110 At 717D-E.
'II Supra note 58.
112 Although the various approaches to retrospective application of the interim and final Constitutions
make interesting reading, the topic cannot be included in this discussion.
113 The first case was reported in 1997 (12) BCLR 1716 (D).
114 At 1724A-1725C.
115 Supra note 104.
16 At 1725D-1726F
117 This case was reported in 1998 (4) SA 753 (CC).
118 Supra note 58.
119 Paragraphs 20-1.
120 Paragraph 12.
121 Paragraphs 17-19.
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involved a public ceremony, formalities and obligations on both parties. 122
The issue of cohabitants' contracts and polygamous marriages was expressly
left open, and it was made clear that other incidents of Muslim marriages
would not necessarily be covered by the judgment. 23 Despite the court's
statement that the case did not involve difficult policy and political choices, 124
the judgment has been persuasively criticized for the political and social
implications of its narrow focus on contract, rather than family relationships,
for its failure to extend its ambit to other incidences of Muslim marriages and
its pre-occupation with the de facto monogamous nature of the marriage.
Beth Goldblatt indicates that this minimalist approach excludes polygamous
and other family groups from the ambit of legal protection and retains the
traditional common-law bias in favour of monogamous family groups. 125
This offers little hope of legal assistance to the most disadvantaged group of
Muslim women who are involved in polygamous marriages. The conservative
nature of the judgment emerges particularly when contrasted with courts'
willingness to extend the incidents of marriage to gay and lesbian families.
Although the courts in the gay and lesbian cases are similarly unwilling to
confront the common-law definition of marriage, their substantive equality
analyses draw attention to the practical and symbolic effects of their exclusion
from the institution of marriage for gay and lesbian couples. No similar
analysis is to be found in relation to Muslim marriages and the issue of gender
equality is not canvassed at all, despite the fact that the Commission for
Gender Equality acted as an amicus curiae in the SCA Amod case. 126
When compared with the cases involving customary marriage, it is obvious
that courts are equally reluctant to face the issues around gender equality and
the recognition of freedom of religion. With the exception of Mabena v
Letsoalo,127 courts seem unwilling to enter into debates around the contents
of both Muslim personal law and customary law, and reluctant to change or
develop these rules to give effect to the dictates of gender equality and to
accommodate changing practices in South Africa.
2.4 Relationships between family members
2.4.1 The rights offathers of children born out of wedlock
The debate about the common-law rule that fathers of children born out
of wedlock have no inherent rights of access or custody, but may obtain such
rights where it would be in the interests of the child, was initiated by Van Erk
v Holmer. 128 Basing its decision on the duty on such fathers to pay maintenance
122 Paragraphs 20 and 23.
123 Paragraphs 24 and 27.
124 Paragraph 28.
125 'Amod v Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund (Commission for Gender Equality Intervening) 1999 (4)
SA 1319 (SCA)' (2000) 16 SAJHR 138.
126 Supra note 58.
127 Supra note 77.
1- 1992 (2) SA 636 (W).
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and the best interests of the child, the court held that fathers of extra-marital
children have, according to the common law, inherent rights of access to their
children. 129 The decision was criticized by a judge in the same division 130
before being overruled by the Appellate Division in B v S.1 3 1 The court stated
that the conmion-law rule was that 'the right to access depends for its
existence on parental authority A father such as this appellant does not have
that in the eyes of the law. But he may be granted access if that is in the best
interests of his child.' 132 Subsequent cases did not assert that fathers of
extra-marital children had automatic rights, but based their decisions to allow
access on the fact that the biological bonds between children and their natural
fathers rendered contact between them in the interests of the children.
133
The matter was driven to a head by the applications of Laurie Fraser to be
allowed to adopt his son, born out of wedlock. The first case 134 involved an
attempt to prevent the mother from giving the child up for adoption. The
application for a prohibitory interdict was dismissed on the basis that the father
of a child born out of wedlock has no clear right upon which to base his case.
This was followed by a review of the adoption proceedings135 in terms of the
Child Care Act 74 of 1983. The court set aside the adoption order on the
basis that the father had suffered prejudice because the Children's Court did
not afford him a hearing in the adoption. The issue of the constitutionality of
s 18(4)(d) of the Act, which requires only the consent of a mother for the
adoption of an extra-marital child, was referred to the Constitutional Court.
The Constitutional Court 136 found the provisions unconstitutional
because they discriminated unfairly between fathers in different unions. While
the Act required the permission of fathers of children born from customary
marriages, no such permission was required from fathers of children born
from Muslim marriages. Since both of these are potentially polygamous, the
differentiation was held to be unfair and unjustified. 137 The argument that the
provisions also discriminated unfairly between mothers and fathers failed to
take account of the different positions of mothers and fathers of new-born
children which could justify different legal treatment. However, in i;espect of
older children who had formed strong bonds with both parents, the legal
treatment should be the same. 138 A further argument, that the provisions
constituted unfair discrimination between married and unmarried fathers,
was likewise partially successfil. Although there may be some justification for
differentiating between married and unmarried fathers in certain contexts, a
129 At 648H-1 and 649G-H.
'30 S v S 1993 (2) SA 200 (W).
131 1995 (3) SA 571 (A).
132 At 579H.
133 Chodree v Vally 1996 (2) SA 28 (W) at 32E-F; Bethell v Bland 1996 (2) SA 194 (W) at 209G-H; T v
M 1997 (1) SA 54 (A) at 60B-C. See my analysis of this trend in 'Of biological bonds, new fathers and the
best interests of children' (1997) 13 SAJHR 622.
134 Fraser v Naude [1996] All SA 99 (M).
135 Fraser v Children's Court, Pretoria North 1997 (2) SA 218 (T).
136 Fraser v Children's Court, Pretoria North 1997 (2) SA 261 (CC).
137 Paragraphs 21-3.
138 Paragraph 25.
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blanket rule which assumes that all married fathers have bonds with their
children, while all unmarried fathers do not, was unsatisfactory However, any
blanket rule which would require permission from all fathers of extra-marital
children would mean that men who father children through rape or incest
would be placed in the same position as committed, caring parents.139 The
court found the legislation to be unconstitutional, but suspended the decla-
ration for a period of two years to enable Parliament to draft nuanced
legislation which would take into account all of these factors. 140 It cautioned
that in doing so, Parliament should be careful not to add to the disadvantages.
suffered by single mothers, and that solutions adopted in first-world countries
would not necessarily be suitable in the South African context. 141
This careful, balanced judgment seemed to have brought the issue of
adoptions into line with the common-law position regarding access, namely
that the father of a child born out of wedlock would be able to obtain parental
rights, not automatically, but on convincing a court that it would be in the
best interests of the child. 142 However, in Wicks v Fischer143 a court granted a
final interdict preventing the mother of an extra-marital child from relocating
to the United Kingdom with her child on the basis that the father had shown
reasonable chances of success in a proposed application for custody of the
child. 144 The decision represented an extension of the common law and was
justified by referring to the constitutional duty to develop the common law
and the Constitutional Court judgment in the Fraser case. 145 However, the
court failed to explain fully the constitutional reasoning behind the decision.
Instead, it focused on the fact that having access to his father was in the interests
of the child and even referred to 'his right of access to both parents'. 146
Decisions to allow unmarried fathers access, and some decisions to refuse
permission to custodian parents to relocate, are often justified by referring to
the rights of children to have relationships with both parents. I have pointed
out elsewhere that the existence of this legal right would be put to the test
when a child claimed access rights from a reluctant father.147 This occurred
in Jooste v Botha,148 where a child born out of wedlock claimed love,
recognition and access from his father who was prepared only to meet his
maintenance obligations. The child claimed that his constitutional rights were
horizontally enforceable against his parents and that the court had a duty to
develop the common law to incorporate this right or to provide a remedy in
139 Paragraphs 26-9.
140 The result is the Natural Fathers of Children Born out of Wedlock Act 86 of 1997 which allows
a father to apply for custody, access or adoption under circumstances which indicate that he had developed a
bond with the child.
141 Paragraph 44.
142 The two further Fraser cases, Naude v Fraser 1998 (4) SA 539 (SCA) and Fraser v Naude 1999 (1) SA
1 (CC), concern technical matters and are not relevant to this discussion.
143 1999 (2) SA 504 (N).
144 At 511F-G.
145 At 510H-1. Fraser v Children's Court, Pretoria North supra note 136.
146 At 508B and 509F--G.
147 'Clean breaks: Custody, access and parents' rights to relocate' (2000) 16 SAJHR 486 at 491.
148 Supra note 16.
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the form of a mandamus. 149 The exception that the claim showed no cause
of action was upheld on the basis that, despite the existence of children's
constitutional rights to family or parental care, 150 the common law did not
afford a child a right to parental affection.
The court held that the child's right to family or parental care was only
vertically applicable against the state in the form of a duty not to interfere
with the family unit,151 but not directly applicable against parents. The right
would be indirectly horizontally applicable in the sense that it would influence
the exercise of judicial discretion and the interpretation of public policy.152
The court refused to develop the common law to give effect to these rights
for two reasons. First, the recognition of such rights would infringe upon the
privacy rights of fathers and their new family units153 and, secondly, the 'right'
to affection was, despite the tendency to describe it as a right, a moral
entitlement and unenforceable as between spouses and between parents and
children. 154
The court defined the words 'parent' and 'family' in s 28 to refer to the
custodian parent and the child. 155 Moreover, it held that the best-interests
principle in s 28(2) of the Constitution amounts not to a legal right which
should be applied horizontally, but a general guideline. 156 The difference
between this case and cases where rights are claimed by parents and not by
children should be obvious. A more satisfactory understanding of the access
rights of children is found in Vv V,157 where the court held that '[a]ccess is
therefore not a unilateral exercise of a right by a child, but part of a continuing
relationship between parent and child'. 158
2.4.2 Children: Relocation, custody and adoption
Adoption is regulated not by the common law but by the Child Care
Act 74 of 1983, which does not allow a South African child to be adopted by
non-citizens. 159 The constitutionality ofthis section was challenged in Minister
of Welfare and Population Development v Fitzpatrick.160 The court held the
provision to be unconstitutional on the basis that it may sometimes be in
the interests of a child to be adopted by foreigners. 16 1 In the course of the
149 The arguments on behalf of the child are summarized at 203D-E.
150 Section 28(1)(b) of the final Constitution.
151 At 205E,2071-J and 208F
152 At 209D-E.
153 At 205F-G.
154 At 206B-G and 207C-E.
155 At 208F-G and 209A-B.
156 At 21OC-E.
157 Supra note 47.
158 At 189C-E.
159 Section 18(4)(0. See SW v F 1997 (1) SA 796 (0), which deals with the effect of the interim
Constitution on a decision to dispense with parental consent to adoption where the consent is withheld
unreasonably.
160 2000 (7) BCLR 713 (CC).The case was first heard by the Cape High Court and reported as Fitzpatrick
v Minister of Social Welfare and Pensions 2000 (3) SA 139 (C).
161 Paragraphs 19-20.
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judgment it held that although the best interests standard was a vague and
ill-defined concept, it enables courts to take account of different considera-
tions in different cases and contexts. 162 Thus, 'what is actually in the best
interests of a particular child or children is obviously a question of fact in each
specific case'. 163
In relocation cases, courts are required to balance the rights of custodian
parents freely to make decisions about their lives, the access rights of
non-custodian parents and the interests of the children. 164 At common law a
court will not lightly interfere with a reasonable and bona fide decision of
the custodian parent to relocate. 165 Post-Constitution cases sometimes refer
to the constitutional principle that the best interests of the child should be
regarded as paramount, 166 but others fail even to mention the Constitution
in this area of law.167 The reason seems to be the assumption by courts
that the application of the best interests principle in the common law accords
with the Constitution 168 and that this area of law therefore requires no
development. I have indicated elsewhere that decisions in this area of family
law, despite the apparent simplicity of the common-law principle, remain
unpredictable and contradictory and that an analysis of the various constitu-
tional rights may be useful in formulating a more explicit principle. 169
Interesting developments in this area relate firstly to the definition of family
in the post-divorce setting. There are indications that some High Courts are
unwilling to reconstitute the pre-divorce family at the expense of the unit of
custodian parent and children. 170 Another is the use of the concept of the
primary caretaker and the recognition that the financial and emotional
interests of children are linked to those of their primary caretakers. 171 These
trends are not, however, found in the majority judgment in the latest SCA
decision.172 Instead, it emphasized the importance of maintaining emotional
bonds between a non-custodian mother and her young daughters. 173
162 Paragraph 18.
163 Lubbe v Du Plessis 2001 (4) SA 57 (C) at 66E.
164 Latoufv Latouf[2001] 2 All SA 377 (T) at 385i-j; Schutte vJacobs (2) 2001 (2) SA 478 (W) at 481H-I.
165 Jackson vJackson 2002 (2) SA 303 (SCA).
166 Van Rooyen v Van Rooyen 1999 (4) SA 435 (C) at 437F-G.
167 Godbeer v Godbeer 2000 (3) SA 976 (W); Latoufv Latoufsupra note 164; the minority decision in
Jackson vJackson supra note 165 mentions the best interests principle at 308A-B and 315F, but the majority
decision contains no mention of the Constitution.
168 In H v R 2001 (3) SA 623 (C) at 6271 the court says of the best interests principle in the Constitution:
'This is nothing new and has always been the traditional approach of our Courts.' The case is also reported
as Heynike v Roets [2001] 2 All SA 79 (C). See also Jackson vJackson supra note 165 at 315F
169 Bonthuys op cit note 147. The only case in which such an analysis is attempted is Van Rooyen v Van
Rooyen supra note 166 at 4371, which mentions that the rights of parents should be considered in the light
of the best interests of the child.
170 !,an Rooyen v Van Rooyen supra note 166 at 439H; Godbeer v Godbeer supra note 167 at 982A-C and
983A; H v R supra note 168 at 628F-G.
171 Van Rooyen v Van Rooyen supra note 166 at 438F-H and 439A-G; Godbeerv Godbeersupra note 167
at 9801-J.
172 The minority judgment in Jackson vJackson supra note 165 at 317D-F does, however, explain the
common-law rule by saying that it is in the best interests of a child that the custodian parent, who bears
primary responsibility for raising the children, should be unfettered in her reasonable decisions about the
raising of the children.
173 At 323C.
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This links to the question whether gender-specific common-law rules, like
that of the maternal preference, are constitutionally sound. In Fraser the
Constitutional Court indicated that where fathers and mothers are differently
situated in respect of children, such rules would not necessarily be regarded
as discriminating impermissibly on the basis of gender. 174 In President of the
Republic of South Africa v Hugo175 the constitutionality of a special remission
of prison sentences of mothers of young children was challenged on the basis
of gender equality. The minority judgment by Kriegler J held that women's
primary responsibility for childcare is both a cause and a consequence of
patriarchy in a society where childrearing is held in low esteem. Pardoning
women because of their childrearing role would therefore reinforce this
stereotypical and prejudicial division of labour and harm women generally. 176
In her minority judgment O'Regan J argued that although the long-term
goal should be the equal treatment of women and men, equal treatment in
circumstances where they do not actually perform the same functions, would
entrench inequality. Thus, different treatment on the basis of family responsi-
bilities, where it is clear that women bear the burden of childcare, should be
allowed.177
Thus, it would seem that retaining the maternal preference rule in custody
cases where the mother had been the primary caretaker would be permissible
and that the dictum in Van der Linde v Van der Linde 78 - that men nowadays
participate in childcare to an extent which would justify the adoption of a
gender-neutral custody rule - should not be followed. The only custody case
which has dealt more extensively with fundamental rights after the adoption
of the Constitution is Ex parte Critchfield.179 On the authority of the Fraser
and Hugo cases, the court held that the prohibition of discrimination on the
basis of gender would not mean that mothers and fathers should be treated
absolutely the same. 180 While mothers should be regarded as the preferred
custodians of young children, a court should also take notice of factors which
favour fathers in particular instances. This would not only accord with the
best interests principle, but also with the common law.181 However, most of
the custody cases do not refer to the Constitution or attempt a constitutional
analysis. Like the relocation cases, courts seem to assume the common-law
174 See the text which pertains to note 136.
175 1997 (4) SA 1 (CC).
176 Paragraphs 80 and 83.
177 Paragraphs 110-14. This was also the position taken in the majority judgment by GoldstoneJ (see
paras 37-47). See, however, Woolworths (Pty) Lid v Whitehead (Women's Legal Centre Trust intervening) 2000 (3)
SA 529 (LAC), in which the court, holding that a refusal to employ a pregnant woman could bejustified on
economic considerations, stated in para 143 that 'Western culture could derive much wisdom from the view
prevalent in African, Hindu, Muslim and Chinese cultures that the first few weeks of a child's life should be
a special time with its mother, with both of them freed as much as possible from outside distractions and
surrounded by love and support. Moreover, motherhood is not some minor inconvenience in a woman'slife.
I also think we should be astute not to cultivate the idea that motherhood is entirely secondary to the greater
glories ofjob satisfaction'
178 1996 (3) SA 509 (0) at 515B-H.
179 Supra note 51.
180 At 327h.
181 At 330a-c.
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position to be in line with the Constitution. This is also the position in relation
to access 182
2.4.3 Abduction and the effects of domestic violence on the child
The central constitutional issue in abduction cases is whether the provi-
sions of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of Child Abduction
(1980) give effect to the best interests of children who are to be returned to
their countries oforigin in terms thereof. Kirsch v Kirsch,183 which was decided
before the Convention became part of South African law,184 held that the
abducted child should be returned as if the Convention applied. The reason
was that the constitutional and common-law principle of the best interests of
the child had to be interpreted in accordance with international law.185The
Convention embodies the idea that it would be in the interests of a child for
a custody dispute to be decided by a court of origin.186 In the particular
circumstances of the case, where the mother alleged that the father had been
guilty of abusing the child, the courts in the country of origin would be in
the best position to have access to and evaluate the evidence of such abuse. 187
The Convention was declared to be compatible with the best interests
principle and thus constitutional in Sonderup v Tondelli.' 88 The court distin-
guished between the long-term interests of children, which were relevant to
custody decisions, and 'the interplay of the long-term and short-term best
interests of children in jurisdictional matters' 189 and held that the latter was
compromised by the Convention mechanisms that prevent a South African
court, which has to decide whether to return the child, from consulting the
best interests of the child. However, after conducting a proportionality analysis
in terms of the limitations clause, 190 the court held the limitations on the best
interests of the child to be justifiable.
My main difficulty in respect of this case is not the issue of constitutionality,
but its treatment of the domestic violence alleged by the mother to be
endangering both her and her child. Even though the court held that the
existence of domestic violence towards the mother could also pose a risk of
harm to the child, 191 it found no grave risk of serious harm to the child. The
main harm facing the child was considered to result from the contested
182 See Laibbe v Du Plessis supra note 163; AIlsop v McCann 2001 (2) SA 706 (C); I v S 2000 (2) SA
993 (C).
183 [1999] 2 All SA 193 (C), also reported as K v K 1999 (4) SA 691 (C).
184 This was done by the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of Child Abduction Act 72 of 1996.
185 At 204f-g.
186 At 205f-207d.
187 At 210h-211i. See also R'S v LS 2000 (4) SA 104 (C) and Smith V Smith 2001 (3) SA 845 (SCA),
which deal with the interpretation of the Convention and are not directly relevant to this article.
188 2001 (1)SA 1171 (CC).
189 Paragraph 28.
190 Section 36 of the final Constitution.
191 Paragraph 34. See also S v Baloyi (Minister of Justice & another Intervening) 2000 (2) SA 425 (CC),
paras 16 and 18, where the Constitutional Court had shown some understanding of the ways in which
patriarchy, the private/public dichotomy and liberal understandings of the concepts of privacy and autonomy
interact to deprive women of protection against domestic violence.
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custody case as exacerbated by the mother's illegal conduct in removing the
child. 192 The mother's submissions, however, included evidence of a restraint
order against the father and comments by a Canadian judge that the father
was angry, hostile and barely in control. 1931 am not suggesting that whenever
a woman alleges that there has been domestic violence the Hague Convention
should not apply. Nevertheless, it is disappointing that the Constitutional
Court seems to view domestic violence as an almost normal consequence of
marital conflict and fails to regard it seriously,194 especially in light of the
constitutional right to be free from violence from public or private sources. 195
2.4.4 Economic rights offamily members
Courts' eagerness to extended the duty of support to gay and lesbian life
partners and spouses in Muslim marriages seems to extend also to applications
for maintenance pendente lite. In Heystek v Heystek196 the defence to a wife's
application for maintenance pendente lite was that the money would be used
to maintain her three children from a previous marriage. The court
acknowledged that at common law a man had no legal duty to maintain his
stepchildren, but held that, during the subsistence of a marriage in community
of property, he had a duty to contribute to the common household of which
the children formed part. It added that the children's rights to parental care
were not limited to their natural parents, but extended also to stepparents. 197
This clearly conflicts withJooste v Botha,198 where the constitutional rights of
children were interpreted to coincide with existing common-law rules. The
court added, without analysing the need for an consequences of its statement,
that the common law should be changed 'to serve the constitutional impera-
tives of the child in a heterogeneous democratic society'.1 99
In Cary v Cary200 a wife claimed a contribution to costs for a pending
divorce action. According to the common law the scale of the contribution
to which a spouse is entitled depends on the scale on which the other spouse
will litigate, the complexities of the case and the means of the respondent. 20 1
Not content with having articulated the common-law position, the court
added that it should, in the exercise of its discretion as to the amount awarded,
be informed by the constitutional rights to equality, equal protection of
the law and dignity. This would entail that 'the applicant is entitled to a
192 Paragraphs 46-7.
193 Paragraphs 38-40.
'94 This is frequently so in custody and access cases. See Elsje Bonthuys 'Spoiling the child: Domestic
violence and the interests of children' (1999) 15 SAJHR 308 at 317-19 and the cases cited there.
195 Final Constitution, s 12()(c). See also Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security (Centre for Applied
Legal Studies intervening) 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC), in which the obligation upon the state to protect women
from gender-based violence was held to require the development of the common law ofdelict.
196 2002 (2) SA 754 MT).
197 At 757A-B and 757C-D.
198 Supra note 16.
199 At 757E-G.
200 1999 (3) SA 615 (C).
201 See Nicholson v Nicholson 1998 (1) SA 48 (M) at 50C-G; Senior v Senior 1999 (4) SA 955 (W) at
963G-H.
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contribution towards her costs which would ensure equality of arms in the
divorce action'. 202 In light of the detailed common-law rule which would
not only ensure equality of arms, but also litigation on a scale which is
adequate to the complexity of the matter, this attempt at constitutional
embroidery seems unnecessary. Moreover, apart from mentioning the
constitutional rights, the court failed to explain how they were to operate and
interact in the present context.
In contrast with the zeal for legal reform displayed in these cases, Greenspan
v Greenspan203 did not even mention the Constitution. An application for a
lump sum of maintenance pendente lite to cover the expenses of moving out
of the communal home and the purchase of furniture and transport was
dismissed on the basis that maintenance envisages periodic payments and
would not extend to lump sum payments. This technical interpretation was
overruled on appeal without reference to the Constitution.204 One could,
however, argue that the hardship which is caused for wives and children should
be subject to a constitutional analysis and that this is an area of the common
law which is in need of development. 20 5 The common-law rule that arrears
maintenance cannot be claimed unless the wife had contracted debts in order
to maintain herself 206 is another area of maintenance law which could
arguably be in need of reform, but, despite the reference to it in the Cary
case, 207 the rule has not yet been constitutionally challenged.
A widow has an action for loss of support against the person who
unlawfully caused the death of her husband. In Glass v Santam Insurance Ltd2O8
the court held that as soon as a widow remarries, her loss of support ends,
since she is then maintained by the new husband and evidence that the second
husband is financially worse off than the deceased husband would not be
admissible. In Ongevallekommissaris v Santam Bpk209 the correctness of this
position was questioned. The court explained that the aim of the action for
loss of support was to place the widow in the same financial position she
would have occupied, had her husband not been killed. Where the action is
heard before the widow's remarriage, the chances of her remarrying are
factored into the calculation of the amount. Where, however, a widow had
remarried, evidence that her second husband is less able to support her than
the deceased husband should be allowed in order to compensate her ade-
quately. The argument that this rule discriminated between widows who had
not remarried and those who had remarried was not accepted. The court held
that the calculation of the chances of remarriage of an unmarried widow had
to be made at the time when the claim was heard. 2 10 However, beyond the
202 At 621D-E.
203 00Df (2) SA 283 (C). See also Zuiegelaar v Zwiegelaar !999 (1) SA 1182 (C).
204 Zwiegelaar v Zwviegelaar 2001 (1) SA 1208 (SCA).
205 The definition of maintenance in the new Maintenance Act 99 of 1998 would now preclude such
an interpretation.
206 Dodo v Dodo 1990 (2) SA 77 (W).
207 Supra note 200 at 622E.
208 1992 (1) SA 901 (W).
209 1999 (1) SA 251 (SCA).
210 At 262H-236B.
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mere assertion that there was no impermissible discrimination, the court did
not perform a thorough equality analysis. 211
In Lebeloane v Lebeloane212 a wife applied for the commnittal to prison for
contempt of court of her ex-husband who failed to obey a maintenance order
in respect of their minor child. The respondent argued that imprisonment for
contempt is unconstitutional. The court simply refused to decide the constitu-
tional issue because the amount of money involved was small, it involved
maintenance and should therefore not be delayed, and the constitutional
aspects were insufficiently argued. Moreover, finding the committal proceed-
ings unconstitutional would have far-reaching consequences. 2 13 This is not
convincing. The small amount of money should be irrelevant, since small
amounts of maintenance are important to poorer people who are as entitled
to constitutional rights as the affluent. Moreover, if the court was dissatisfied
with the constitutional arguments it could have called for further argument.
3 FORM: HOW DO THE COURTS DEAL WITH THE
OPERATION OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS ON AN
ABSTRACT LEVEL?
3.1 Developing the common law
The text of the Constitution does not indicate precisely how, if it is found
to be deficient, the common law should be developed. 214Johan de Waal et al
argue 215 that indirect application of the Bill of Rights to the common law
takes three forms. First, courts alter common-law principles to bring them in
line with the Bill of Rights; secondly, they apply existing common-law rules
in a manner which would be consistent with the Bill of Rights; and, thirdly,
the fundamental constitutional values inform open-ended common-law
principles like boni mores and public policy. Direct application of the Bill of
Rights to the common law, although a rare occurrence, would involve
declaring unconstitutional common-law rules invalid as in National Coalition
for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice216 or the creation of new
constitutional remedies or the award of constitutional damages. This was
unsuccessfully attempted in Botha vJooste.217
Where the need arises for the development of the common law the
Carmichele case 2 18 indicates that
'there are two stages to the inquiry a court is obliged to undertake. They cannot be
hermetically separated from one another. The first stage is to consider whether the existing
common law, having regard to the section 39(2)219 objectives, requires development in
211 The reduction of claims on the basis that a widow has a chance of remarriage may in itself be
unconstitutional.
212 2001 (1) SA 1079 (W).
213 Paragraph 26.
214 Belinda van Heerden et al Boberg's Law of Persons and the Family 2 ed (1999) 13-14.
215 Op cit note 3 at 75-7. See also the Carmichele case supra note 195, para 56.
216 Supra note 29. This was unsuccessful in relation to customary law in Mthembu v Letsela supra note 67.
217 Supra note 16.
218 Supra note 195.
219 It states that '[w]hen interpreting any legislation,and when developing the common law or customary
law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights'.
BILL OF RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT OF FAMILY LAW 773
accordance with these objectives. This inquiry requires a reconsideration of the common
law in the light of section 39(2). If this inquiry leads to a positive answer, the second
stage concerns itself with how such development is to take place in order to meet the
section 39(2) objectives.'220
Where the common law is said to be unfairly discriminatory, the first step of
this analysis should be an equality analysis, taking account of constitutional
jurisprudence on the nature of discrimination. 221
In measuring cases which deal with the development of the common law
against the two-step procedure identified in the Carmichele case,222 certain
patterns or styles ofjudgment emerge. In contrast with the detailed analysis
of the impact of the common law crimes by the Constitutional Court in
National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice,223 many
courts do not embark on such an analysis of the common law at all. Certain
cases, especially those dealing with the best interests of children, assume simply
that the existing common law perfectly reflects the proper balance between
fundamental rights and therefore fail to deal with the first question. 224 A
variant in this category is the failure to acknowledge or a denial of glaring
constitutional issues in the form of conflicting rights to culture or religion
and gender equality.225 This includes the failure to deal with the degree to
which the common law conforms with the Constitution, but in these cases
courts assume that common law is incompatible with the Constitution and
proceed to change the common-law rules drastically.226
The second part of the procedure in Carmichele227 involves the develop-
ment of the common law. In an article examining adjudication styles in private
law Cockrell points to the belief that judges do not create common law, but
merely discover and declare pre-existing common-law rules.228 An interesting
interplay between this fiction and the necessity for developing the common
law in response to the Constitution is to be found in the High Court
judgment in the Amod case. 229 The court was faced with the dilemma of
having to apply the final Constitution retrospectively to overturn Appellate
Division authority which held that no duty of support arose between spouses
in Muslim marriages. The court held that changes of common-law rules in
response to the Bill of Rights would inevitably be retrospective, because the
common law is not created, but merely found. 230 This means that, where the
220 Paragraph 40.
221 This will be discussed below.
222 Supra note 195.
223 Supra note 29.
224 See the above discussion headed 2.4.2 Children: Relocation, custody and adoption.
225 See Mthembu v Letsela supra note 67; Hlope v Mahlalela supra note 74; Prior v Battle supra note 82;
Metiso v Padongelukfonds supra note 87; Kalla v The Master supra note 99; Sundenip v Tondelli supra note 188;
Ongevallekommissaris v Santam supra note 209; Cary v Cary supra note 200; and Lebeloane v Lebeloane supra
note 212.
226 See Langemaat supra note 52; Cary v Cary supra note 200; Heystek supra note 196.
227 Supra note 195.
228 Cockrell op cit note 18 at 591. This leads to a formal style of reasoning in relation to the conmmon
law (at 593-6).
229 Supra note 113.
230 At 1721D-I. The court based itself on the use of this fiction by the Constitutional Court in Du
Plessis v De Klerk supra note 7, para 65.
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common law is adapted in response to constitutional values, the law holds
that the 'new, adapted' common-law rule has always existed, but has not been
recognized until 'discovered' by the court developing the rule. If revised
common-law rules always exist in a state of limbo until their discovery, it
would only be fair and in the interests ofjustice that the Constitution should
apply to disputes involving the common law, regardless of whether the cause
of action arose before or after its enactment. 23 1
This raises another dilemma: High Courts should logically then be required
to overturn pre-constitutional Appellate Division formulations of the
common law which fail to reflect fundamental constitutional rights. In order
to overcome this problem, the High Court in Amod held that the ability to
develop the common law was limited to incremental extensions of common-
law rules, but did not extend to the elimination of existing common-law rules
which directly contradict fundamental rights. Such changes are the province
of the legislature.232 The argument points to a fundamental problem caused
by the fiction that the common law is only discovered and not made byjudges.
If common-law rules giving effect to the fundamental rights have always
existed then there is no logical difference between 'finding' a supplementary
common-law rule which has not yet been articulated and 'discovering' that
the way in which a particular rule has always been articulated is wrong and
should be re-articulated in accordance with the Constitution. Other courts
developing the common law do not refer to this fiction. The SCA in the Amod
case found that the interim Constitution was retrospectively applicable to the
case on the basis that the ethos of tolerance and respect for diversity which it
embodied, had already been ushered in when the cause of action arose. 233
In National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister ofJustice234 the
Constitutional Court was careful to indicate that a common-law rule should
only be struck down in so far as this was necessary.235 In determining this, the
court had to look to the purpose of the rule and its interaction with other
common-law and statutory rules in order to establish the effect of changing
a rule upon the coherence and adequacy of the system as a whole.236Although
some family-law judgments develop the common law by arguing that existing
rules contain gaps which need to be filled, or through the operation of general
policy or discretionary concepts, 237 others indicate simply that existing
common-law authority is wrong in light of the Constitution and should be
231 High Court decision supra note 113 at 1722A-C.
232 At 1723D-J. The court relied on the dictum in Du Plessis v De Kerk supra note 7 at 855 which dealt
with the direct horizontal application of the interim Constitution. It is generally accepted that the issue of
direct horizontal application in relation to the final Constitution is not to be decided on the same basis as
that of the interim Constitution.
233 Paragraph 20.
234 Supra note 29.
235 Paragraph 67.
236 Paragraphs 69-71.
237 The SCA in Amod v Multilateral Motor Vehide Accidents Fund (Commissionfor Gender Equality Intervening)
supra note 58 indicated both that the ambit of the duty of support in Roman-Dutch law was uncertain and
that it depended on the articulation of public policy. See paras 10, 12 and 23.
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changed. 238 The effect of changing one specific common-law rule upon the
other rules of family law is not taken into account at all.
What emerges from a closer look at the way in which courts deal with the
conmon law, then, is the marked difference between the careful, comprehen-
sive analysis of the Constitutional Court and the way in which some High
Courts either avoid constitutional issues or nonchalantly change common-
law rules. The Constitution requires that declarations by High Courts that
legislation is unconstitutional should be confirmed by the Constitutional
Court, 239 but no similar requirement exists in relation to the common law.
This may very well save the Constitutional Court's valuable time and prevent
duplication of decisions, but in light of the High Courts' evident discomfort
with matters constitutional, it also means that developments of the common
law may be less thorough and nuanced than matters which deal with the
constitutionality of legislation. It also means that the Constitutional Court
does not have many opportunities to provide High Courts with guidance on
the proper way to develop the common law. This could eventually lead to
problems when the SCA may need to re-integrate the various High Court
pronouncements upon common-law rules.
3.2 Judicial minimalism
According to De Waal et al, the principle of judicial minimalism entails
that courts should leave scope for Parliament to amend laws.240 Furthermore,
the possibility of the indirect application of the Bill of Rights by the
development of the common law should be considered before that of direct
application. Constitutional issues should not be anticipated unless it is
necessary and, when it becomes necessary, constitutional rules should be
formulated as narrowly as possible. This should mean that constitutional
jurisprudence develops gradually and, hopefully, harmoniously.
Examining family-law jurisprudence in this respect provides interesting
insights about the kinds of issues which courts are hesitant to face. The central
problem in all the gay and lesbian cases, the cases about Muslim marriage, and
some customary marriage cases is the common-law definition of marriage.
Although courts have been very eager to extend the consequences of family
life to gay and lesbian partners, they have studiously avoided the fundamental
reason for the lack of common-law protection of such families to the extent
of not even mentioning the common law definition of marriage. The
judgment in the National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of
Home Affairs24 1 to the effect that gay and lesbian couples are capable of
238 See Langemaat supra note 52; Ryland v Edros supra note 104; V v V supra note 47; and Heystek v
Heystek supra note 196.
239 Section 167(5).
240 Op cit note 3 at 66-70. See also lain Currie 'Judicious avoidance' (1999) 15 SAJHR 138 and
ChristopherJ Roederer 'Judicious engagement: Theory, attitude and community' (1999) 15 SAJHR 486 for
an opposing view. This is linked to the issue of the separation of powers, which does not form part of this
article.
241 Supra note 37.
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founding all the elements of the consortium omnis vitae, 242 however, would
strengthen challenges to the common-law definition. The judgment is also
notable for the way in which it expressly refuses to extend its findings in
relation to the rights of gay and lesbian partners to other family groups, like
Muslim families and cohabitants, who may also have an interest in the demise
of the common-law definition of marriage. 243 The SCA judgment in the
Amod case 244 is similarly cautious to hmit its finding of a duty of support from
a Muslim marriage to monogamous marriages. 245
At the same time, however, where courts are willing to grant relief, the
principle of minimalism is not applied over-rigorously. In A mod, for instance,
the SCA held that the fact that the legislature could amend the common law
of maintenance does not preclude courts from doing so.246 It added that 'this
is not a case which involves difficult policy and political choices which should
appropriately be left to the Legislature'. 247 This is questionable. In a society
where monogamous Christian marriages have hitherto been favoured at the
expense of customary and Muslim marriages, extending legal consequences
to Muslim marriages cannot be described as anything other than political.
Family law is replete with political problems, particularly relating to religion
and race. Classifying a particular problem as political should not shield courts
from having to deal with it. The Constitution is a profoundly political
document and courts should not use the label of politics to screen certain
problems from its influence.
By way of contrast, in cases involving competing rights to culture and
gender discrimination, courts are unwilling to develop customary law. In the
second Mthembu case 248 the court held that developing the customary rule of
succession would affect other rules of customary law, was the subject of a Law
Commission investigation and was best left to the legislature.249 This issue is
not inherently more political or less contentious than extending the right to
family life to gay and lesbian couples and a court would be ideally situated
to pronounce on the relationship between the competing fundamental
rights to culture and gender equality. On the other hand, some cases, particu-
larly Langemaat, where the court was required to consider the constitutionality
of legislation, appear only too eager to develop the common law on the
basis of very little authority or reasoning.
242 Paragraph 46.
243 Paragraphs 60 and 87.
244 Supra note 58.
245 Paragraph 24. See also Ryland v Edros supra note 104 at 707F and 709D.
246 See also the CC judgment in National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Hone Affairs
supra note 37, paras 73-6, where the court sets out the principles relating to 'reading in' but points out that
where courts read words into legislation, Parliament can subsequently change the effect of a judgment by
way of legislation.
247 Paragraph 28.
248 Supra note 70.
249 At 686H-687C. See also Prior v Battle supra note 82 at 1020I-J for similar reasoning and Lebeloane
v Lebeloane supra note 212 for a complete refusal to entertain constitutional arguments.
BILL OF RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT OF FAMILY LAW
4 CONTENT: WHAT DO COURTS DO WITH THE RIGHTS
IN THE BILL OF RIGHTS IN THE FAMILY-LAW CONTEXT?
4.1 Understanding discrimination and equality
When the constitutionality of a legal rule is challenged on the basis of
unfair discrimination, a court should perform an equality analysis to deter-
mine the validity of the rule. The Constitutional Court jurisprudence in the
lesbian and gay cases provides a yardstick for the adequacy of such analyses. It
requires a substantive vision of equality to which the impact of the legal rule
on the dignity of the applicant and other members of her group should be
central. The challenged rules should not be viewed in isolation, but in the
legal, social and economic context which affect the lives of the applicants and
other group members. Courts should therefore be able to take judicial notice
not only of the ways in which different legal rules interact, but also of people's
social and economic circumstances and particularly the historical reality of
oppression. In analysing existing and historical patterns of discrimination,
courts should attempt to place themselves in the position of the applicants. It
is unnecessary to identify a single ground upon which a particular rule
discriminates, since legal rules can simultaneously discriminate on more than
one basis and these intersecting grounds of discrimination can in turn create
different contexts for different members of particular groups.
Unfortunately this detailed analysis is absent from many High Court cases
which deal with equality. Overlapping discrimination on the bases of gender,
culture, religion and race in the Muslim marriage and customary-law cases
remains unexplored, and courts seem unable to place themselves in the
position of Muslim and African women who are subject to customary law.
In the gay and lesbian cases the argument that the disputed legal rules do
not prevent lesbian and gay people from marrying partners of the opposite
sex (and thus obtaining the rights and privileges open to heterosexual spouses)
in effect contends that the rules are neutral and apply equally to heterosexual
and homosexual people. This argument was rejected on the basis that it
confuses substance with form. Homosexual and heterosexual people are
differently situated in relation to the legal rules and the constitutionality of
the ostensibly neutral rule should be measured by the impact which it has on
the different groups. 250 The same emphasis on impact and the realization that
groups of people may occupy different positions also drives the decisions
which deal with gender-neutral rules allocating parental responsibilities and
rights.251 Thus, clearly, substantive equality is preferred over formal equality.252
250 National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Home Affairs (CC) supra note 37, paras 34
and 35; Satchwell v President of the RSA supra note 56, para 17.
251 See President of the Republic of South Africa v Hugo supra note 175; Fraser v Children's Court, Pretoria
North (CC) supra note 136.
252 While formal equality would be concerned merely with the existence of different treatment,
substantive equality focuses on the effect of different treatment given the positions which different groups
occupy in society. See generally Janet Kentridge 'Sexual equality and discrimination: A reply to Meyerson'
(1994) 10 SAJHR 298.
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It is, however, not always clear that High Courts dealing with the right to
equality comprehend this distinction. Cases like Cary v Gary,25 3 Prior v
Battle,254 Kalla v The Master255 and Van der Linde v Van der Linde256 that refer
to the need for equality without discussing it more fully, sometimes create the
impression that equality refers to sameness of treatment, unrelated to context.
On the other hand, some cases assume differential treatment to be justified
without an analysis of its impact on advancing substantive equality.257
4.2 Culture, religion and human rights
The customary-lawjudgments generally fail to notice the fact that African
women have historically been discriminated against on the intersecting bases
of race, class, gender and culture. This is not limited to the civil-law rules
which failed, for a long time, to recognize customary marriage, but also in the
customary law of marriage and succession. Cases like Mthembu v Letsela258
which hold that customary law should be screened from constitutional
analysis because people (presumably women) choose to marry according to
this system fail completely to take account of the social circumstances which
operate to limit the choices of women in this regard. Nor do assumptions that
customary law operates in contemporary urban areas exactly like it did in
rural pre-colonial villages259 reflect a judicial awareness of the concrete social
and economic circumstances of urban African women or a stance ofjudicial
empathy. A substantive equality analysis would have avoided these failures in
reasoning.
At the same time, however, members of African communities have rights
to practice their culture. Hlope v Mahlalela260 focuses on the best interests
standard in a way which assumes that African child-raising practices are based
on the sale of children and that the customary legal rules should be replaced
by civil-law norms.261 The right to culture and its interaction with the best
interests of children is simply ignored. Similarly, in Prior v Battle262 and Metiso
v Padongelukfonds263 it seems to be assumed and accepted that patriarchy is
central to the continued existence of customary law in a way which would
be questioned in civil law.
The issues around the recognition of customary family law, its development
in the interests of children and of gender equality are nowhere properly
examined. 264 Instead, courts seem to avoid the issue as far as possible. This is
253 Supra note 200.
254 Supra note 82.
255 Supra note 99.
256 Supra note 178.
257 See for instance Mthembu v Letsela supra note 67.
258 Ibid at 945J-946A.
259 Ibid at 946C-D.
260 Supra note 74.
261 At 458F-459D.
262 Supra note 82.
263 Supra note 87.
264 Even Mabena v Letsoalo supra note 77 does not contain a detailed constitutional analysis.
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also the case when the same issues surface in relation to Muslim marriages.
In the Amod case the SCA had an excellent opportunity to embark upon a
judicial analysis of the ways in which non-recognition of Muslim marriages
in the civil law, gender inequality in Muslim private law and the right to
practise one's religion impact on the position of the complainant and
other Muslim wives. Instead, it failed to pay any attention to the concrete
circumstances of these women's lives and chose to focus narrowly on the
common-law duty of support. 265
4.3 Developing the concept offamily
The iniigration cases have extended the right to dignity to incorporate
the right to family life while the gay and lesbian cases use the right to equality
and an extended notion of the right to privacy to extend the elements of the
consortium omnis vitae to these families. These cases contrast strongly with
the formulation of the rights to family life and parental care inJooste v Botha266
to reflect the pre-constitutional common-law position. Its limited inter-
pretation of the right to privacy as encompassing the father's right not to be
disturbed by his extra-marital child also contrasts with interpretations of
privacy rights as establishing relationships and communities in the gay and
lesbian cases. The court inJooste failed to consider the extent to which the
common law and statutory extension of rights to biological fathers infringe
upon the rights of mothers of extra-marital children and the children
themselves to be free from interference by biological fathers and to choose
to form relationships with biological fathers or not. The wholesale extension
of family rights in the gay and lesbian cases also contrasts with the caution
which courts show in extending rights to family life to Muslim spouses and
children and to cohabitants.
This again raises the question about the validity of the common-law
definition of marriage. The courts could, on the basis of the trend in the gay
and lesbian cases, decide that the common-law definition is inadequate in
failing to encompass same-sex relationships. On the other hand, it could also
hold that the extension of full family rights to Muslim families and cohabitants
calls for legislative intervention. Of course extending the common-law
definition to cover both gay and lesbian and heterosexual Muslim and
cohabiting couples would be logically preferable. On the other hand, hetero-
sexual families have the option to marry in terms of the civil law and thus to
acquire the rights attached to civil marriage while gay and lesbian couples are
precluded by the common-law definition of marriage from doing so.
4.4 The role of the best interests of the child
The constitutional principle that the best interests of children should be
of paramount importance in matters which affect them is already reflected in
265 See also the decision in Allsop v McCann supra note 182.
266 Supra note 16.
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the common law and for this reason courts usually assume that the contents
of common-law rules are perfectly satisfactory. What remains uncertain is
whether the inclusion of the best interests principle in the Constitution would
require courts to take account of other constitutional rights and duties like
gender equality, rights of parents and children to privacy and rights to culture
and religion in interpreting the best interests of the child. I would argue that
such a line of reasoning may be useful in areas where common-law rules are
unclear, like the relocation cases or disputed, as in relation to gender-specific
custody rules.
The issue is complicated by the assertion injooste that the constitutional
best interests principle does not amount to a legal rule, but merely a general
guideline. The reason is that '[i]ts wide formulation is ostensibly so all-
embracing that the interests of the child would override all other legitimate
interests of parents, siblings and third parties. It would prevent conscription
or imprisonment or transfer or dismissal by the employer of the parent where
that is not in the child's interest.'267 This is clearly an overstatement. The
fundamental problem both in this case and generally in custody and access
cases is probably that the best interests of the child is usually equated with the
legal rights of parents. No constitutional right is immune from interpretation
by the courts and there is no single right which would trump all other rights
at stake. The essence ofBill oflRightsjurisprudence is the balancing ofvarious
competing rights and interests and I see no reason why the best interests
principle should be an exception. The inclusion of the best interests principle
in the Constitution would merely strengthen the argument that where the
rights of other persons are affected by a decision, as they often are in custody
and other child-related matters, courts should interpret this right with
reference to the other fundamental rights.
The argument inJooste that children's rights to parental care are not directly
enforceable against parents simply does not reflect the state of the common
law.268 The right to be maintained is enforceable against both parents.
Children's rights to education are enforceable against parents who have a legal
duty to send them to school and to pay for their basic education. Rights to
parental care and attention are indirectly enforceable in the sense that parents
who neglect or ill-treat children will be punished in terms of the Child Care
Act 74 of 1983. The court's distinction between legal rights and moral
entitlements which cannot be legally enforced may be valid as far as parental
affection is concerned. However, the right to have contact with a child in
order to develop or maintain ties of affection is one which is regularly upheld
where parents, including unmarried fathers, claim access. Why this right
should be enforceable by parents but not by children is unclear.
267 At 210C-E.
268 The Constitutional Court in Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46
(CC) held specifically that children's rights to adequate housing are primarily enforceable against their parents
and not against the state. The provision of parental care in the form of maintenance, education and the
provision of the daily needs of children are therefore directly horizontally applicable and have been so in
the common law
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5 CONCLUSION
Cockrel 269 expresses the opinion that the indirect horizontal application
of the Bill of Rights would lead to a substantive style of reasoning in which
courts 'engage with normative issues rather than rely on "authority reasons" '
when dealing with private law and specifically the common law. Constitu-
tional values and moral, economic, political and institutional reasons should
therefore underpin these decisions. In his review of the Constitutional Court's
first judgments he finds that such substantive reasoning has been relatively
scarce and points out that High Court judges seem to fear that substantive
reasoning would deprive them of the certainty associated with formal
reasoning.270 In their application of the Bill of Rights to family law, it seems
that judges are driven by these fears to avoid undertaking extensive constitu-
tional analysis of the common law. The Constitutional Court seems to have
a clear idea of the method which should be followed and the issues which
should be canvassed. The High Court judgments, however, are seldom
extensively or properly reasoned. Some courts adhere closely to the safety
provided by the shores of Constitutional Courtjudgments, some pretend that
the sea of constitutional interpretation does not exist and play happily on the
beach, while yet others venture enthusiastically into the deep of the Bill of
Rights, there to splash and splutter and grasp for the lifelines of bold assertions
of fundamental rights. 27'
To a great extent the impression that family law has undergone radical
changes as a result of its interaction with the Bill of Rights is created by the
changes in relation to gay and lesbian couples. In this respect the role of the
Coalition in driving reform not just for gays and lesbians, but in family law
in general should be acknowledged. However, it should be clear from my
analysis above that the ultimate aim of developing a coherent jurisprudence
in relation to the interaction between the Bill of Rights and private law has
not yet materialized. Developments within the particular areas are not
necessary complementary or harmonious. Instead, different trends within
different areas contradict one another and the progressive jurisprudence in the
area of lesbian and gay family life has largely failed to spill over into other areas.
Given this uneven development of human rights in family law, one could
argue that it would have been better to have included a right to family life in
the Constitution, rather than allowing courts to develop this right on a
piecemeal basis. Contrary to the assertion in the Certificationjudgment272 that
the inclusion of such a right would encourage litigation about the definition
and formation of families, the lack thereof has lead to various such disputes.
Had the right to family life been included in the Constitution, the Constitu-
tional Court would have had to deal with its extent and ambit, and current
contradictory judgments could possibly have been avoided.
269 Op cit note 5 para 3A1 and 3A2.
270 Cockrell 'Rainbow jurisprudence'op cit note 18 at 11 and 36.
271 See for instance the Satchwell case supra note 56, as compared to the Langemaat case supra note 52.
272 Supra note 19.
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Ultimately the measure of the successful incorporation of ajurisprudence
of fundamental rights into the area of family law should be the extent to
which it has lead to improvements in the legal rules which apply to the legally
most neglected groups, namely African women and children and Muslim
wives. The adequacy of the new legal rules should, if we take the notion of
substantive equality seriously, be measured against the extent to which the
social and material conditions of members of disadvantaged groups have been
improved. It would seem that,although gay and lesbian families have benefited
from constitutional developments in family law, the most disadvantaged
groups of women and children cannot count on the courts to be as proactive
on their behalf, but must await statutory intervention to ameliorate their
position.
FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND TREASON THROUGH THE AGES
Tacitus relates the decision of Tiberius to resume prosecutions for treason, in the wake
of verses critical of the emperor doing the rounds, thus:
'The tide of "father of his country" which the people had so often thrust upon him,
Tiberius refused, nor would he allow obedience to be sworn to his enactments... But
he did not thereby create a beliefin his patriotism, for he had revived the law of treason,
the name of which indeed was known in ancient times,though other matters came under
its jurisdiction, such as the betrayal of an army, or seditious stirring up of the people, or,
in short, any corrupt act by which a man had impaired "the majesty of Rome." Deeds
only were liable to accusation; words went unpunished.'
P Cornelius Tacitus The Annals translated by Alfred John Church & William Jackson
Brodribb (University of Chicago / Encyclopaedia Britannica: The Great Books 1952)
Book 1.72.
'[Antonius Matthaeus II De Criminibus ad libros 47 et 48 Digestorum Commentarius (1644)
48.2.2] is no justification for making violence against the State an element of treason.
On the contrary armed rebellion is one form of treason; initiating a political group or a
faction against the State is another ... In various cases through the years our Courts and,
more specifically, the Appellate Division had occasion to deal with treason and sedition.
In R v Endemann 1915 TPD 142, during a time of war, the accused was charged with
sedition in that he intended to endanger public order and tranquillity and to resist and
defy the lawful authority of the Government by wrongfully, unlawfully, maliciously and
seditiously publishing and uttering certain statements. No violence against the State -
actual or intended - was alleged. Tielman Roos, who appeared for the accused, submitted
that to constitute the crime of sedition in our law there must be the element of violence
and that the words charged could in no case be sedition, [but the court did not agree]"
MrJustice Van der Walt in S v Mayekiso 1988 (4) 739 at 743 and 746, giving judgment
in an application for the discharge of the accused after the state had closed its case in the
trial of'Moss' Mayekiso, then Chairperson of the Alexandra Action Committee.
